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In Defense of Penalizing (but not Punishing) Civil Disobedience‡ 
David Lefkowitz, University of Richmond 
Contemporary defenders of a liberal-democratic state’s legitimate authority who 
argue explicitly from within the republican tradition, or whose arguments can be recast in 
republican terms, maintain that in the circumstances of politics individuals can treat one 
another justly only by obeying the law (see, e.g., Waldron 1999; Sitlz 2009; Christiano 
2010; Dworkin 1986, read in light of Dworkin 2011).1  Yet these same theorists argue that 
civil disobedience is sometimes justifiable even when undertaken to advance reforms that 
would not, in fact, morally improve law or public policy.  How can we reconcile these 
two claims?  One strategy is to abandon one or the other; that is, to deny the existence of 
a general duty to obey the law, or to deny that those who have such a duty have a right to 
engage in civil disobedience.  I have defended an alternative strategy, arguing that the 
duty correlative to a liberal-democratic states’ legitimate right to rule is disjunctive: 
citizens must either obey the law or engage in suitably constrained acts of civil 












maintain, enjoy a moral right to civil disobedience, one that precludes the state from 
punishing, though not from penalizing, civil disobedients. 
In her recent book Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience, 
Kimberley Brownlee has subjected this analysis of the moral right to civil disobedience 
to two lines of criticism, both which I aim to rebut in this essay (Brownlee 2012; see also 
Brownlee 2008).  I begin in section I with a brief summary of my original argument for 
the aforementioned analysis of the moral right to civil disobedience.  In section II, I 
defend the claim that this right derives from a more general right to political participation 
and not, as Brownlee maintains, from an individual’s right to preserve his or her integrity.  
The success of this argument is vital to the defense of a liberal-democratic state’s right to 
penalize civil disobedience, since the moral rationale for such a practice rests on the place 
it has in a larger institutionalized system of democratic governance.  I then respond in 
section III to four objections Brownlee raises to the claim that a legitimate state enjoys a 
right to penalize civil disobedients, including that it rests on a mistaken understanding of 
the concept of a right of conduct, and that the justifications I offer for the practice of 
penalizing civil disobedience conflict with respect for the autonomy or reasons 
responsiveness of those who engage in it responsibly.  As my rebuttals to these objections 
make clear, our differences of opinion over the grounds and scope of the moral right to 
civil disobedience rest almost entirely on disagreements regarding two foundational 
issues: first, whether moral rights are best conceived of as defeasible evaluative 
	 3	
principles or conclusive normative principles, and second, whether principles of justice 
should be theorized on the basis of full or partial compliance.3  
I 
I take civil disobedience to consist paradigmatically in deliberate disobedience to 
one or more laws of a state for the purpose of advocating a change to that state’s laws or 
policies.  In a state without a justifiable claim to political authority, civil disobedience in 
itself presents no moral difficulty.  While certain consequences of such an act may make 
that act morally problematic – for instance, if it directly harms innocent third parties – no 
moral significance attaches to the mere fact that it involves disobedience to the law.  This 
is not so in a state with a justifiable claim to political authority, however, for citizens of 
such a state have a general duty to obey the law that correlates to the state’s right to rule 














problematic in itself, independent of other moral considerations that may bear 
contingently on any particular act of civil disobedience. 
The reconciliation of the practice of civil disobedience with a state’s right to rule 
must therefore begin with a specific defense of legitimate political authority.  The one on 
which I have relied in the past proceeds as follows (Lefkowitz 2007).  Suppose that all 
moral agents, as such, enjoy certain basic rights, including (but not necessarily limited to) 
a right to be free from deliberately or recklessly inflicted bodily harm, a right to freedom 
of religious belief and practice, a right to freedom of speech, a right to adequate nutrition, 
and a right to basic health care. Correlative to these rights are duties on all other moral 
agents to see to it that they are not violated.  I suggest that in order to do so individual 
agents need to act collectively, and that modern states consist partly of institutions 
designed to facilitate this sort of collective action. Laws serve to specify the design of 
these institutions, spelling out both the state of affairs to be realized by collective action, 
i.e. the specific content of people’s rights, and the form that each actor’s participation in 
the collective enterprise ought to take.  Yet reasonable disagreement will inevitably arise 
with respect to these matters; that is, with respect to what the law ought to be.5  In such 
circumstances – those characterized by (a) the moral necessity of collective action, and 
(b) reasonable disagreement over the form collective action ought to take – the 
recognition of each person’s equal status as an autonomous agent requires a decision 
procedure that suitably motivated agents could not reasonably reject.  I contend that 





to all those with a duty to participate in (or contribute to) the legal order, a minimally 
democratic and liberal state meets this condition.6 
A minimally democratic decision procedure is an institutional response to two 
competing moral demands.  On the one hand, there are the claims of those whose proper 
moral treatment requires collective action, responsiveness to which provides the ends of a 
justified modern state.  On the other hand, there are the reasonable claims of various 
individuals regarding the specification of those ends and the morally best means to their 
realization.  Responding to the former in a timely manner may require that official 
deliberation come to a close, say with the taking of a vote, so that some collective action 
can take place.7  Yet oftentimes those who find themselves in the minority when such a 
vote occurs may justifiably complain that, had there been further time for debate and 
deliberation, or had they enjoyed greater resources for the dissemination of their 
arguments, their own (reasonable) views might have won majority support.  In 
recognition of this fact, the moral right to political participation should be understood to 
give rise to two more specific moral rights – one a right to participate in the decision 










continue to contest the decision reached by such a process after the fact by a variety of 
means, including suitably constrained civil disobedience. 
Why think the morally permissible means for doing so should include civil 
disobedience, rather than being limited to legal means?  One reason is that the legal 
means for contesting inadequate or unjust laws or policies will take too long, say because 
many citizens are unaware of, or presently unable to appreciate, certain relevant 
information.  In the time it will take to construct a majority supporting the reform of 
those laws, significant and perhaps irreversible injustices may take place.  By engaging in 
acts of civil disobedience, would-be reformers may reasonably hope to speed up the 
process by which a new majority can be created.  In addition, civil disobedience is an 
especially effective mechanism for the expression by a minority of the intensity of their 
views.8  Civil disobedients’ willingness to risk the state’s imposition of various costs on 
them and possibly the anger of their fellow citizens can often communicate the strength 
of their convictions or preferences in ways that legal means for political participation 
cannot.  If the majority feels less strongly about the particular law or policy at issue, they 
may be willing to reconsider, and perhaps even reverse, their earlier decision. 
But why think that these advantages provide a justification for a moral right to 
civil disobedience?  Why is it not just tough luck for the agents who find themselves in 







decision procedure concludes?  The answer is that the best understanding of the moral 
right to political participation is one that reduces as much as possible the degree to which 
it is a matter of luck whether one attracts majority support for one’s views regarding what 
justice requires, consistent with the ability of the state to achieve those ends that provide 
a moral justification for its existence and authority.  That is, respect for agents’ moral 
right to political participation requires that potential barriers to their effective exercise of 
this right be diminished as much as possible, given the aforementioned constraint.  In 
light of this understanding of what respect for agents’ moral right to political 
participation involves, an account of that right as including both a moral right to legal 
means of participation and a moral right to civil disobedience, as explicated in this paper, 
ought to be preferred to an account that includes only the former right. 
Certain constraints on the moral right to civil disobedience follow from an 
understanding of it as derived from a more general right to political participation.  For 
example, only acts of public communication fall within the scope of the moral right to 
civil disobedience.  Individuals who conscientiously disobey the law without having as 
(one of) their aims communicating to some members of the political community their 
belief that a given law or policy ought to be reformed do not perform an act that falls 
within the scope of the moral right to civil disobedience.  Furthermore, the moral right to 
civil disobedience encompasses only non-coercive political acts, since coercing the state 
into abandoning or adopting certain policies usurps the equal authority of all citizens to 
determine what the law ought to be.  Finally, I maintain that the moral right to civil 
disobedience only precludes punishing those who engage in such conduct, not penalizing 
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them.  Whereas the former response necessarily expresses moral condemnation of an 
illegal act, the latter response does not. 
Both instrumental and symbolic considerations justify the state’s right to penalize 
those who engage in civil disobedience.  Beginning with the former, penalizing civil 
disobedients can contribute to the stability of the state, and so its ability to facilitate 
morally necessary collective action.  Citizens of a legitimate state have a moral right to 
publicly disobey the law to contest any law or policy they believe to be unjust, no matter 
how small the injustice.  However, imposing some costs on those who engage in public 
disobedience makes it more likely that actions with the potential to reduce the state’s 
ability to successfully and efficiently apply laws and policies will only take place when 
the injustice of existing laws and policies is believed to be significant.  In addition, by 
accepting a penalty such as a fine for engaging in civil disobedience agents can 
symbolically recognize the costs their illegal conduct impose on others, and perhaps more 
importantly, symbolically affirm the citizens’ collective authority to settle reasonable 
















Is the moral right to civil disobedience best understood as a remedy for the 
shortcomings that even moderately well-functioning democratic institutions suffer in 
their attempt to realize equal political participation, as I contend?  Or is it instead a 
primary right to act in fidelity to one’s conscientious convictions regardless of whether 
one enjoys effective equal political participation, as Brownlee claims?10  In what follows I 
offer rebuttals to the three primary objections Brownlee raises to the derivation of a moral 
right to civil disobedience from a more general right to political participation, and so by 
implication in favor of her own position.  
Brownlee’s first complaint is that a remedial account makes the existence of a 
moral right to civil disobedience contingent on that practice being “the only way, or 
undeniably the best way, to redress unjust imbalances in participatory power” (Brownlee 
2012, p. 144).  One response is to point out that while the remedial account makes the 
existence of a moral right to civil disobedience contingent on certain facts about how 
democratic institutions function, these facts are so deep that in any actual political 





participation will include a moral right to civil disobedience (Markovits 2005; Smith 
2013).  A second, complementary, response is to argue that (per impossible) were a 
political society to suffer no “unjust imbalances in participatory power,” or were the 
practice of suitably constrained civil disobedience to contribute nothing to reducing them, 
it is Brownlee who must justify the claim that individuals should nevertheless enjoy a 
moral right to engage in illegal conduct for the purpose of advancing reforms to the 
community’s law or policy. 
A second criticism Brownlee advances against the derivation of a right to civil 
disobedience from a more general right to political participation is that it is implicitly 
committed to the false claim that individuals have a moral right to be heard, and not 
simply a right to express themselves.  “The minorities’ argument that they should be 
allowed to step outside the law to participate, because were there more time for debate or 
were they better resourced their view might have triumphed, implies that they have a 
claim to compensation or reparation for not being attended to by those shaping the 
debate” (Brownlee 2012, p. 144).  This misconstrues the minority’s “bad luck” argument, 
however.  Their complaint is not that their views were not considered, but that the 
likelihood of their views receiving consideration was shaped by luck; e.g. by differing 
degrees of access to the media, or the brevity of the time period given to deliberation 
prior to the enactment of a law or policy.  The right to political participation does not 
include a right to be heard, but insofar as it is a right enjoyed by all members of the 
community, it does include the claim that all should have an equal opportunity to shape 
the debate over the content of the community’s law and policy.  Rather than construing 
the moral right to civil disobedience as compensation to particular agents, we ought 
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instead to think of it as compensating for certain shortcomings common and perhaps 
endemic to the practice of democratic decision-making. 
Brownlee’s third and primary objection to characterizing the moral right to civil 
disobedience as a remedial right has two related elements: first, it entails that the state has 
no duty to accommodate conscientiously motivated disobedience to law that is either not 
undertaken to change law or policy, or not performed by a member of a “vulnerable 
minority,” and second, it fails to recognize that it is the agent’s interest in preserving his 
or her integrity, not in political participation, that the moral right to civil disobedience 
protects.  Yet an argument like my own that grounds a right to civil disobedience in a 
more general right to political participation does not entail that the state has a duty to 
accommodate conscientious disobedience to law only when undertaken for a political aim 
by disempowered minorities.  Indeed, Brownlee recognizes this, as she writes: “…the 
standard view is that a humanistic principle gives modest protection for private personal 
disobedience, but not for civil disobedience” (Brownlee 2012, p. 145).  Why, then, does 
she reject the “standard liberal view” that distinguishes two rights to conscientious 
disobedience to law: a moral right to civil disobedience grounded in a fundamental 
interest in equal political participation, and a moral right to conscientious objection 
grounded in a fundamental interest in preserving integrity?  One reason may be that she 
conflates the kind of conduct that falls under a right to conscientious objection with what 
she labels private disobedience; conscientiously motivated disobedience to law that is 
either evasive or non-communicative, or both.  As I understand the “standard liberal 
view,” however, what distinguishes conscientious disobedience from civil disobedience 
is not that the former is evasive or non-communicative while the latter is not.  Rather, it is 
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the aim of those who engage in the two types of conduct that distinguishes them, with the 
civil disobedient aiming to bring about reform to law or policy, and the conscientious 
objector simply seeking an exemption from some law or policy she believes to be unjust. 
Both conscientious objection (or, as I put it elsewhere, petitions for conscientious 
objector status) and civil disobedience are public, communicative, acts, and both differ in 
those respects from private disobedience.  Once we broaden our typology of 
conscientious disobedience to law to include three types – private disobedience, civil 
disobedience, and conscientious objection – instead of following Brownlee in employing 
only the first two of the aforementioned types, then the reasons Brownlee gives for 
rejecting a characterization of civil disobedience as a facet of the general right to political 
participation fail to persuade (see also Ceva 2015). 
III 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of my analysis of the moral right to civil 
disobedience is the claim that it only precludes the state from punishing, but not from 
penalizing, those who engage in such conduct.   Though some contemporary theorists of 
civil disobedience endorse this position, others demur, with Brownlee once again 
providing the most careful and detailed criticisms.  In what follows I offer a response to 
four of Brownlee’s objections to characterizing the moral right to civil disobedience as a 
claim against punishment but not penalty.11  Before I do so, however, the precise nature of 
our disagreement warrants emphasis.  Brownlee acknowledges that in some cases 





justification for imposing certain costs on civil disobedients; for example, a fine for their 
illegal conduct.  However, Brownlee maintains, while I deny, that when it does so the 
state nevertheless wrongs the civil disobedient, or in terms introduced by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, the state infringes but does not violate the civil disobedient’s right to engage in 
conscientious, communicative, disobedience to law.  Thus on Brownlee’s account the 
state owes civil disobedients an apology for its “hard treatment” of them, even if that 
treatment is what morality calls for all things considered.  As I will explain, the 
persuasiveness of our respective analyses of the moral right to civil disobedience depends 
to a considerable extent on whether one share’s Brownlee’s intuition that an apology is 
called for in these circumstances, or instead concurs with my sense that at most we ought 
to regret the fact that civil disobedients must pay a penalty to act as they do.  These 
conflicting intuitions reflect two deep theoretical disagreements that underlie several of 
the criticisms Brownlee advances, as well as my rebuttals to them.  The first concerns the 
place of rights in practical deliberation: are they inputs, as Brownlee thinks, or are they 
outputs, as I maintain.  The second disagreement concerns the role that considerations of 
feasibility ought to play in developing a theory of moral rights.  Whereas I maintain that a 
morality for human beings, including an account of the content of individual’s moral 
rights, ought to assume partial compliance, Brownlee appears to presume the opposite.  
The positions one finds most compelling in these more general disputes may well 
determine whether one agrees with Brownlee’s specific objections to penalizing civil 
disobedients, or instead accepts my defense of such a practice.         
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Objection #1:  The claim that civil disobedients have a right not to be punished but 
no right not to be penalized conflicts with a proper understanding of the concept of 
a right of conduct.   
 
Rights of conduct, Brownlee asserts, “provide defeasible normative protection of 
a sphere of autonomy against all forms of coercive interference by others” (Brownlee 
2012, p. 244).  It follows, as a conceptual matter, that the right to civil disobedience 
cannot exclude punishment but not penalty, since the latter still constitutes a form of 
coercive interference with the performance of acts of civil disobedience.   
This analysis of the concept of a right of conduct stands in need of defense, 
however, and I contend that we have no compelling reason to think of rights of conduct 
as providing general but defeasible reasons not to interfere with an agent rather than 
specific but absolute constraints on such interference, as my characterization of a right to 
civil disobedience suggests.  For example, some criticize the latter understanding of 
rights because it entails that the full content of any right is unknowable.  Yet the 
conception of rights as general but defeasible faces an analogous criticism, namely that 
no one can know all of those cases in which a given right defeats or is defeated by other 
rights (or other moral considerations).  More importantly, even those with an incomplete 
understanding of a concept can successfully use it to navigate many situations; witness 
many people’s ability to use their imperfect knowledge of their legal rights to do so.  
Another objection to a specificationist account of rights is that they render rights the 
conclusions of moral arguments, rather than premises in them.  But if rights are general 
but defeasible then the real work of determining what an agent may or must do is done 
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not by rights but by the values those rights serve to protect, honor, or advance.  As 
George Rainbolt writes, “in non-metaphorical terms, to weigh one right against another is 
to examine the arguments for the view for and against particular assertions of actual 
rights” (Rainbolt 2006, p. 161).  In light of this observation, the importance of the claim 
that general but defeasible rights can serve as premises in moral arguments is hardly 
obvious.  Finally, some maintain that we need a notion of rights as general but defeasible 
to ground claims to compensation or apology, the so-called “moral remainder” created by 
the infringement of a right.  However, the argument for this conclusion often begins with 
an undefended assumption that in a particular case compensation or apology is in fact 
appropriate, something specificationists frequently deny.  Feinberg’s cabin example, in 
which a person caught in an unexpected blizzard breaks into another person’s cabin and 
burns one of the chairs inside to keep warm, is a case in point (Feinberg 1978).  Who 
should bear the loss that results from conduct for which no one is morally at fault is 
hardly obvious, and a variety of considerations including equity and efficiency may 
support principles that assign the loss to the property owner, the perpetrator, or the 
community at large.     
Of the three rationales offered for conceiving of rights of conduct as general but 
defeasible it is the “moral remainder” argument that figures centrally in Brownlee’s 
critique of the right to civil disobedience as excluding punishment but not penalty.  But as 
I noted in the preceding paragraph, to successfully advance a “moral remainder” 
argument for a general but defeasible right a theorist must first defend her claim that in 
performing an act seemingly or normally precluded by the right in question the agent 
treated the right-holder unjustly.  Just as we should not assume that a person who breaks 
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into another’s cabin in order to avoid freezing to death has a duty to compensate and/or to 
offer an apology to the cabin owner, and so argue on that basis that the property right is 
general but defeasible, so too we should not assume that the state owes a civil disobedient 
an apology for penalizing her, and so argue on that basis that the moral right to civil 
disobedience is general but defeasible.  Rather, we need an argument demonstrating that 
the state wrongs the civil disobedient when it penalizes her in order to establish that an 
apology is called for.12  Brownlee attempts to offer such an argument in the next two 
objections I consider.  My aim here is simply to rebut her argument that we have 
conceptual, as opposed to substantive moral, grounds for rejecting the characterization of 
a right to civil disobedience as protection against punishment but not penalty.13    
Substantively, Brownlee objects to penalizing civil disobedients on the grounds 
that such treatment fails to respect them as autonomous, reasoning agents.  She 
distinguishes two such objections, the first of which focuses on penalty as a means for 












Objection #2: In penalizing the civil disobedient, the state fails to address her as an 
agent capable of responding appropriately to the moral reasons that apply to her.   
 
Instead, it treats her as if she is only owed prudential reasons, or is only capable of 
responding to prudential reasons, and thereby implies that the civil disobedient has an 
inferior status rather than recognizing her as a moral equal.  Brownlee writes: “when a 
judge penalizes a disobedient primarily to deter her from engaging in undesired behavior 
he disregards her status as a reasoning, autonomous agent and treats her as a mere brute 
responsive to a threatened stick” (Brownlee 2012, p. 245). 
The practice of penalizing civil disobedience need not convey this understanding 
of the disobedient’s ability to respond to reasons, however.  Rather, the state can and 
should point to the moral reason she has to endorse a practice whereby the state penalizes 
but does not punish those who engage in suitably constrained civil disobedience.  Such a 
practice aims to strike the optimal balance between giving all citizens effective 
opportunities to participate in democratic decision-making and maintaining the state’s 
ability to perform its moral functions, i.e. its capacity to facilitate the citizenry’s 
collective pursuit of a just social order.  Indeed, contrary to Brownlee’s assertion in the 
above quotation, by explicitly not responding to the civil disobedient’s violation of the 
law as if it were a common crime the state communicates the message that it does not 
view civil disobedience to be undesirable per se, nor does it (morally) disapprove of 
actors engaging in such conduct.  
Yet if a legitimate liberal-democratic state should not view civil disobedience as 
undesirable per se, then why should it enjoy a right to impose a burden on those who 
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engage in it?   Brownlee focuses on one answer to this question, namely the need to deter 
people from engaging in non-conscientious disobedience to law (and, if it is not the same 
thing, disobedience that communicates a conscientious conviction in ways that exceed the 
scope of the moral right to civil disobedience).  I argue below that insofar as such 
disobedience is an ineliminable feature of human society it ought to constrain our account 
of the content of the moral right to civil disobedience.  However, the rationale for 
penalizing civil disobedience does not rest solely on the need to deter others who would 
otherwise engage in non-conscientious disobedience to law.   
Even conscientiously undertaken civil disobedience will typically require the state 
to redirect resources it would otherwise use to achieve what a majority of citizens, 
employing a morally justifiable decision-procedure, have determined to be required by 
justice.  As an empirical matter, the higher the incidence of civil disobedience of any kind 
the greater will be the compromise to the state’s ability to perform its moral function.  
While the moral importance of enhancing citizens’ opportunities for effective political 
participation warrants some tradeoff in this respect, the other values in the balance 
require that we adopt institutional practices that mitigate citizens’ recourse to civil 
disobedience.  Indeed, insofar as civil disobedience is properly defended on the grounds 
that it contributes to effective political participation, the brake on the frequency of its 
performance created by a practice of penalizing civil disobedients may serve to enhance 
its value as a means for communicating the claim that some law or policy stands in need 
of reform (see also Smith 2013, p. 96).  Of course, for Brownlee such an advantage will 
not count in favor of construing the right to civil disobedience as precluding punishment 
but not penalty, since whatever benefits the practice of conscientious disobedience to law 
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generates for legitimate or just democratic rule will be incidental to its proper 
justification, namely the individual’s fidelity to conscience or preservation of her 
integrity (Brownlee 2012, p. 146).  But as I argued in the previous section, Brownlee’s 
rationale for theorizing all conscientiously motivated disobedience to law as grounded in 
a single right to conscientious action rests on a failure to distinguish conscientious 
objection from both civil disobedience and personal disobedience. 
It may be helpful to think of the amount of civil disobedience a state can tolerate 
without a morally unjustifiable reduction in its ability to perform its moral function as a 
common resource.  The challenge is to devise a set of norms for the use (consumption) of 
that resource that will enable a community to generate the maximum value from it.  The 
value in this case consists in the contribution that suitably constrained civil disobedience 
can make to citizens’ effective political participation (and, hopefully, its realization of a 
substantively just social order).  It serves as a means for ameliorating to some degree 
certain defects in realizing effective political participation for all citizens that are 
common if not endemic to democratic decision-procedures.  The practice of penalizing 
civil disobedience serves to mitigate the risk of over-consumption of this common 
resource, and encourages uses of it that generate the greatest value; i.e. that focus the 
political community’s attention on what some of its members take to be among its most 
unjust laws or policies. 
The practice of penalizing civil disobedience also provides a useful corrective to 
cognitive biases and systematic errors in reasoning to which all human beings are 
susceptible.  For example, in the face of what we believe to be a deeply unjust law or 
policy we are likely to underestimate the (moral importance of the) impact engaging in 
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civil disobedience will have on the state’s ability to perform its moral function, which is 
just to say that we are likely to fail to respond appropriately to the moral reasons that 
apply to us.  Modest penalties provide a corrective to this kind of bias, a prudential 
supplement to our moral deliberation justified on the grounds that given this fact about 
human beings the practice of penalizing civil disobedience will produce a world in which 
we do better at advancing, promoting, honoring, etc., people’s fundamental interests (and 
perhaps other intrinsically valuable things) than we would in a world in which we did not 
penalize civil disobedients.  The point can be put in terms of hypothetical consent, 
understood as a heuristic device for identifying what we have reason to do.  In order to 
make it more likely that they will employ civil disobedience only in those cases where 
the injustice being protested truly merits the disruption to the state’s ability to perform its 
moral function, individuals would agree in advance to a regulatory scheme according to 
which they would be assessed a penalty for performing acts of civil disobedience. 
A critic might respond that the foregoing arguments falsely assume that the state 
has a fixed amount of resources with which to perform its moral functions. Typically, the 
state can increase its resources by employing more of those resources currently left to 
agents to allocate privately.  Given the moral importance of effective political 
participation, and the argument that this should include engaging in suitably constrained 
civil disobedience, it follows that members of a political community are morally 
obligated to allocate sufficient resources to their political and legal institutions so that 
they can perform their morally necessary functions even while accommodating a 
significant amount of civil disobedience.  The right to political participation may simply 
	 21	
turn out to place greater demands on people’s private control over resources than some 
have thought.   
I happily concede that in some cases particular political communities ought to 
increase the resources they allocate to the state so that it can accommodate an increase in 
the incidence of civil disobedience without significantly reducing its ability to perform its 
moral function.  But I reject the claim that individuals’ interest in effective political 
participation is of such great moral importance that advancing it takes priority over just 
about every other interest, or the claim that even marginal enhancements in effective 
political participation warrant major reductions in people’s ability to pursue other morally 
mandatory or prudentially worthy ends.  Absent such claims, it remains the case that 
penalizing civil disobedience is justifiable if it produces (or at least approximates) the 
optimal level of such conduct, taking into account the other ends members of the political 
community are morally obligated or permitted to pursue.     
To be clear, my claim is not that there is currently too much civil disobedience.  
To the contrary, I think that in a fair number of polities it might well be a good thing if 
the incidence of civil disobedience increased, and adopting a practice of penalizing but 
not punishing civil disobedience might have this effect.  Thus I take my account of the 
morality of civil disobedience to reflect agreement with Rawls’ observation that suitably 
constrained civil disobedience can serve “to inhibit departures from justice and to correct 
them when they occur” (Rawls 1971, p. 383), and so actually enhance the stability of a 
political community’s social order.  My claim is merely (a) that civil disobedience best 
serves this end if its incidence is limited, and limited in ways that encourage individuals 
to engage in such conduct only in response to law or policy they believe to be deeply 
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unjust, and (b) that the practice of penalizing civil disobedience satisfies these 
desiderata.14   
The preceding arguments comprise a rebuttal to Brownlee’s criticism of the 
specific deterrence rationale for the practice of penalizing civil disobedience.  Not 
surprisingly the argument that penalizing civil disobedience is justified by considerations 
of general deterrence fares no better in her eyes.   
 
Objection #3: “when a judge penalizes a civil disobedient primarily to deter other 
people from engaging in undesired behavior he uses her as a means to achieve some 
future good.  Unless further arguments are offered, such use ignores that she has 
certain rights as an autonomous agent that proscribe her being treated that way” 
(Brownlee 2012, p. 246)15  
 
While a general deterrence rationale for penalizing civil disobedients clearly treats 
them as a means, it is not clear that such a practice treats them as a mere means, and at 











problematic conduct.  To treat someone as a mere means is to treat him as if he has value 
only insofar as he is of use to one.  This generic description, however, does not tell us 
what sorts of treatment count as valuing a person solely for their usefulness.  Rather, as 
Brownlee implies, we need to spell out an account of people’s rights in order to give 
content to the notion of being treated as an autonomous agent.  Only then can we identify 
conduct that fails to treat a person as an autonomous agent.  On the account I offer, 
respect for persons as autonomous agents requires submission to a common juridical 
order, one in which individuals enjoy equal authority to determine the content of the law.  
With respect to civil disobedience, my account reconciles the right to engage in such 
conduct with each individual’s duty to treat others justly by deferring to a common 
authoritative determination regarding what counts as doing so.  If I am right to think that 
penalizing civil disobedience strikes the optimal balance between agents’ interests in 
exercising equal authority to make law and the protection of their other fundamental 
interests (including not only welfare interests but status interests), then I am at a loss to 
see why such a practice treats civil disobedients as a mere means.  In paying a penalty for 
her performance of an act of civil disobedience, an agent is not merely being used by the 
state to deter others from opportunistically or recklessly engaging in the same kind of 
conduct.  Rather, she is doing her part to preserve a system of collective governance that 
best serves to advance the morally mandatory goals of sustaining a stable state that 
effectively performs its moral function and empowers its citizens to participate 
effectively in collective governance. 
Brownlee might concede that the foregoing arguments (sometimes) justify the 
state’s penalization of civil disobedience all-things-considered, yet maintain that it fails to 
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demonstrate that in doing so the state does no wrong to those who engage in 
conscientious, communicative, acts of disobedience to law.  All of the rationales I offer to 
justify penalizing civil disobedience turn on the need to deter people from irresponsible 
acts of civil disobedience, whether they be frivolous or opportunistic or merely 
performed without sufficient regard for the impact the practice of civil disobedience has 
on the state’s ability to perform its moral function.  But why should the fact that some 
people will exercise the right to conscientiously violate the law irresponsibly entail that 
those who will exercise that right responsibly must pay a price in order to do so?  The 
issue is not whether imposing the penalty to deter irresponsible actors is justifiable all-
things-considered, but whether the likelihood of others (or my own) irresponsible conduct 
ought to figure in the very specification of what I am entitled to do; that is, in the 
characterization of my right.  Or as Brownlee puts it, “to let the parameters of our rights 
of conscientious action be set by others’ decision to act rashly is to hold those rights 
hostage to the heckler and the zealot…” (Brownlee 2012, p. 245). 
 In response, I maintain that some degree of irresponsible conduct, i.e. conduct 
performed on the basis of a defeated reason, is endemic to human beings.  While its 
incidence and type can be managed, it cannot be eliminated.  As David Schmidtz notes, 
“the extent of compliance [with a principle of right conduct] is not externally determined 
but is instead a function of the principles chosen.  When we choose a principle and any 
particular way of putting it into practice we choose a compliance problem at the same 
time” (Schmidtz 2011, p. 778).  A morality for human beings, a set of principles that 
serve to guide our conduct toward one another (and other intrinsically valuable things), 
must be responsive to the fact that some degree of failure to respond appropriately to the 
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reasons that apply to us is unavoidable.  Specifically, it must treat this fact as a constraint 
on the justifiability of candidate norms governing particular types of conduct, such as the 
one that ought to govern the performance of civil disobedience. 
 In asserting the necessity of theorizing justice this way I diverge in two respects 
from Brownlee.  First, Brownlee appears to assume that we ought to characterize the 
content of moral rights on the assumption of full compliance.  While that assumption may 
never be realized, and so rights-transgressing conduct may be justifiable all-things-
considered, the assumption of full compliance is nevertheless warranted when we attempt 
to theorize the kinds of treatment people are owed; i.e. the content of their rights.  
Second, and relatedly, Brownlee characterizes rights as inputs to moral deliberation, 
considerations that count in favor but do not conclusively determine what an agent ought 
morally to do.  In contrast, I conceive of rights, moral or legal, as the output of moral 
deliberation; specifically, they constitute conclusions regarding the priority that 
advancing or honoring a particular fundamental interest enjoys or does not enjoy vis-à-vis 
advancing or honoring other fundamental interests.  To say that a person has a right if her 
interest is a sufficient reason for holding some other person to be under a duty is not yet 
to say anything about the content of the right and correlative duty.  To answer the latter 
question, we need to develop an account of the norms for human beings that, as a whole, 
best serve to advance or honor our fundamental interests (and other intrinsically valuable 
things).   
 Conduct that does not constitute the violation of another’s right may nevertheless 
harm her, and that fact will often provide appropriate grounds for regret, and expressions 
thereof, on the actor’s part.  This may well be true in the case of penalizing civil 
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disobedience.  Nothing in my account precludes legal officials from expressing to the 
civil disobedients they penalize that “‘we appreciate the value of what you do, but this is 
the necessary price of allowing any illegal protest to occur,’” as Brownlee maintains they 
should (Brownlee 2012, p. 251).  But contrary to what Brownlee implies, an expression 
of regret is not the same thing as the offering of an apology.  The latter is appropriate 
only as a response to one’s own wrongdoing, while the former is an appropriate response 
to any “bad” (e.g. any setback to an agent’s interest), regardless of whether it is the result 
of, or constituted, by a wrong.  And for the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, 
I maintain that a legitimate liberal-democratic state need not do wrong when it penalizes 
civil disobedients, and therefore it need not owe them an apology for doing so.   
Brownlee’s final objection targets what I referred to as the symbolic argument for 
the practice of penalizing civil disobedience. 
 
Objection #4: “If suitably constrained civil disobedience respects the equal authority 
of all to determine what the law ought to be, as Lefkowitz claims it does, then there 
could be no real costs of the relevant kind for disobedients symbolically to 
acknowledge” (Brownlee 2012, p. 247-8). 
 
In one respect I concede this point.  Civil disobedience often does impose costs on 
others, and a considerate agent may well wish to convey to others that she recognizes the 
burden her conduct imposes on them.  Nevertheless, if she acts within her right then she 
has no duty to refrain from imposing those costs.  The more important component of the 
symbolic argument for penalizing civil disobedients, however, consists in the claim that a 
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civil disobedient’s acceptance of a penalty for her illegal protest provides her with a 
means to affirm her fellow citizens’ collective authority to determine the content of the 
law.  Since even suitably constrained civil disobedience frequently imposes costs on 
others, it will often be perceived as, at least in part, an attempt to advance political aims 
through the exercise of power, rather than as a purely communicative contribution to 
political dialogue.  Moreover, in some cases the reforms that civil disobedients pursue for 
the sake of justice will overlap with (what others perceive to be) the advancement of their 
personal interests (i.e. conception of the good life).  While not problematic in itself, this 
may lead to some skepticism regarding their true motives for engaging in acts of illegal 
protest.  This in turn may strengthen the impression that the civil disobedients’ actions 
are nothing more than an attempt to use coercion to impose their own conception of 
justice on others or to advance their private interests.  Acceptance of a penalty for having 
performed an act of civil disobedience serves to mitigate both of these responses.  The 
practice of imposing and accepting penalties for civil disobedience is one whereby both 
parties affirm that the conduct, while illegal, does not carry with it the message implicit 
in the commission of common crimes, namely that the perpetrator enjoys a kind of moral 









* * * 
In sum, the arguments set forth here support two conclusions.  First, civil 
disobedience is best understood as derived from a general right to political participation, 
not an agent’s fundamental interest in preserving her integrity, which grounds a right to 
conscientious objection.  Second, when theorizing the content of the moral right to civil 
disobedience, we ought to focus on the design of an optimal institutionalized practice for 
engaging in, and responding to, this distinctive form of political participation.  Attaching 
penalties to civil disobedience, I have argued, is a central component of such a practice.  
Or rather, this is probably the case for any actual liberal-democratic state since, for 
example, it may be possible that permissible mechanisms for social control other than 
state imposed penalties better conduce to an optimal level of civil disobedience.  My aim 
here, however, has not been to respond to a challenge along these lines, but only to rebut 
conceptual and moral criticisms that do not rely essentially on empirical premises.  
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